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The purpose of this article is to contribute to a better understanding of the contemporary
importance for democracy of the relationship between elected leaders and the security
forces. It attempts to present a conceptualization and framework to help comprehend what
security forces actually do and how they interface with democratic governments. The article
aims to extend the conceptual breadth of the literature on civil–military relations beyond
control to include two further dimensions – effectiveness and efficiency. The research is
based on the authors’ experience in conducting programmes for officers and civilians through-
out the world in line with at least six different roles and missions of security forces. The con-
ceptualization draws on literature in comparative politics, organization theory, and defence
economics, as well as civil–military relations, and security sector reform.
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Introduction
The purpose of this article is to contribute to a better understanding of the contemporary
importance for democracy of the relationship between elected leaders and the security
forces. While there is relatively abundant literature on the role of the armed forces in
democratic transitions (since in much of the world the transitions were from military-
dominated regimes, including those where the military was the government), there is
much less on the armed forces in democratic consolidation, although several prominent
scholars highlight the importance of this issue.1 Virtually all of the literature on the
armed forces and intelligence agencies in established democracies is concerned with
democratic civilian control over them. In the newer democracies, the literature on
these two security instruments usually focuses on how to achieve the control suppo-
sedly already existing in the more established democracies.
There are a number of major lacunae in this literature. First, there is normally little
attention paid to the police, which in most of the newer democracies are national
police forces, at times undertaking military-like roles. Second, and more seriously,
there is little attention in the literature on democratic consolidation and civil–military
relations, especially in relation to what security forces do, and at what cost, that is,
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their effectiveness and efficiency, and the implications of their roles and missions for
democracy. And third, there is often little attention to what they do beyond national
defence. This is surprising, as today very few militaries are primarily trained,
resourced, and prepared to wage combat with other armed forces; armed combat is
probably the least likely role among the six that militaries, and other security
forces, are currently carrying out. These we will discuss later in the article.
In September 2007, there were 83,445 military and police personnel from up to
114 countries engaged in peace support operations (PSO) in 16 countries with con-
flicts. In Afghanistan in late 2007 there were 40,000 troops under the control of
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF), including 14,000 from the US, as well as another 12,000
American troops under American national control. Some of these 52,000 troops
and police were fighting the Taliban, but most were engaged in ‘nation building’.
In early 2007, international peacekeeping forces in Haiti were fighting street
gangs, which is more typically a police function.2 In many regions, military forces
either support or, currently in the case of Mexico, supplant police forces in operations
to combat drug-trafficking and street crime. On the other hand, in countries such as
Bolivia, Colombia, Pakistan, and the Philippines, the police fulfil military functions.
And, since threats span a spectrum from global terrorism, through national and inter-
national drug cartels, to street gangs, militaries and police forces rely heavily on
intelligence agencies to identify threats and plan missions. There is, in short, a
great variety of activities that incorporate different instruments of state security to
deal with contemporary threats, opportunities, and challenges in both national and
international environments. This combination of activities, and the resulting
mixing of armed forces, police, and intelligence agencies, are the issues that demo-
cratically elected policy makers must deal with to meet domestic and, increasingly,
global expectations and standards.
Most conceptual literature on security focuses on armed conflict, most often in the
established democracies, usually with a heavy historical focus. Various scholars,
including Risa Brooks, Stephen Biddle, and Stephen Van Evera, make important con-
tributions to our understanding of the dynamics involving civilians and soldiers, but
only in the context of national defence.3 Today however the armed forces undertake a
variety of roles, as the following quotation from Paul Collier emphasises: ‘this is what
modern armies are for: to supply the global public good of peace in territories that
otherwise have the potential for nightmare’.4 For analysis of the military and security
forces more generally, we would anticipate that the conceptual literature that should
assist scholars and policy makers to understand the instruments states may utilize is
the sub-discipline of civil–military relations (CMR).
However, our argument in this article is that the almost exclusive focus on civilian
control in this literature is a significant impediment to understanding the larger and
more complex relationships concerning democracy and security forces, particularly
when we consider the very wide spectrum of roles and missions. We must remember
that even when civilian control is unquestioned, as in the United States, civilian
control by itself is no guarantee that the policy-makers will make good decisions,
or implement policy in such a way as to result in military success.5 The conceptual
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literature on other security instruments and democracy is also problematic. Most of
the studies that do exist are not analytical but rather about tradecraft, intelligence
failures, or advocate policy positions.6
Rather than rejecting CMR as a concept relevant to democracy, we need to extend
its conceptual breadth. We develop our argument through several stages. First, we
review the most relevant conceptual literature that deals with security in a democracy
and the instruments nations use to achieve it; these will be CMR and security sector
reform (SSR), a concept that emerged in Britain and continental Europe as a reaction
to shortcomings of the old CMR concept, but which is little known or used analyti-
cally in the Western Hemisphere. Second, as we find both CMR and SSR in some
ways lacking, we develop a new conceptualization with three dimensions: democratic
control, effectiveness, and efficiency. Third, we discuss these concepts as they apply
to: (1) the analysis of security forces and the six major roles and missions we identify;
(2) what military and other security forces do, and (3) the implications for democracy.
In this section we also elaborate on the control mechanisms that can be used for roles
and missions beyond strictly national defence. Finally, we highlight some of the main
tradeoffs democratic leaders are likely to face as they seek to balance democratic
control, effectiveness and efficiency.7
Civil–Military Relations in Historical Perspective
The classic literature on CMR, now dating back 50 years, is closely associated with
the books of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz.8 This literature still largely
defines the field today. These authors focus on the more established democracies,
especially the United States, and are mainly concerned with the issue of reconciling
a military strong enough to do what civilian leaders want it to do, with a military sub-
ordinate enough to do only what civilians authorize it to do.9 Or, as Dale Herspring
has recently written, ‘As I surveyed the literature on civil-military relations in the
United States, I was struck by the constant emphasis on “control”.’10 This conceptu-
alization, used exclusively by US authors, assumes a democratic political context,
and is overwhelmingly associated with the Cold War military stand-off between
the ‘West’ and the ‘East’. There are two main concerns in this literature. First is
fear of the threat a large standing army poses to a democracy and the need to keep
it subordinate – that is, under civilian control.11 Second are the implications of a
trade-off between security and liberty. The work of the most prolific current
analyst and critic of this idea, Peter D. Feaver, seems to fit well within these two par-
ameters.12 His most prominent books begin with a well–established and unques-
tioned democratic context, and then examine the CMR issues that arise and the
institutions these democracies employ to manage relations between a civilian govern-
ment and the armed forces. For these reasons, while the amount of attention given to
the ‘crisis in US civil–military relations’ during the presidency of William J. Clinton
might make sense in the US domestic political context, it is not relevant for analytical
purposes in other parts of the world.13 Huntington’s formulation may also be proble-
matic, as it is closely linked to the US democratic experience, of questionable
relevance elsewhere in the world, especially in democratizing countries. For analysis
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of how to achieve this democratic civilian control in the context of political
transitions we turn to the next body of literature.
Civil–Military Relations in the Context of Democratization
Since the beginning of the third wave of democracy, which started on 25 April 1974
in Lisbon with the military coup that became a revolution and gradually evolved into
a democracy, the focus of civil–military issues shifted.14 Even though neither
Portugal nor Spain, whose transition began upon the death of Francisco Franco in
late 1975, were military dictatorships, their militaries played key parts in the tran-
sitions to democracy.15 This was even more the case as the third wave spread to
include explicitly military regimes in Latin America, Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.
Even the transitional governments of the former Marxist-dominated states, although
never under military rule, had to learn to deal with their armed forces once the Berlin
Wall came down and a new political environment began. In Romania, for example,
the army was a central actor in the transition to democracy from the dictatorship of
Nicolae Ceausescu and his nefarious Securitate (secret police). Many analyses of
democratic transitions and consolidation since 1974 include, of necessity, a discus-
sion of CMR. The major contribution by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan on Southern
Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe includes a focus on different
military groups, or CMR, as a central variable under the category of ‘actors’.16 As
noted above, highly regarded analysts of transitions and consolidation, such as
Adam Przeworski and Philippe Schmitter, call explicit attention to the ‘military
variable’ or CMR.17 There also are some excellent case studies of CMR in the
context of transitions and consolidation, or, in the case of Venezuela, what some
see as democratic ‘deconsolidation’.18
These works evaluate the role of the military, including in some cases the intelli-
gence services, in democratic consolidation. Some of these authors also take into
account the institutions involved in CMR. Overall, what these works demonstrate
is that, in contrast to their authoritarian pasts, whether military- or civilian-
dominated, the emerging democracies of South America, post-communist Europe,
sub-Saharan Africa, and elsewhere emphasize democratic security over national
security. In other words, these new regimes focus on how to control the armed
forces, which in many cases were themselves previously in control of – or even
constituted – the government. In most, but not all, of the literature there is yet
again a single focus on control, its achievement and exercise by civilians over the
military. Most of this literature, with some important exceptions, ignores what
the militaries or other instruments of security actually do, as well as the overall
implications for democracy of different sets of roles and missions.19
Security Sector Reform
Security Sector Reform (SSR) was developed as a reaction to the limitations of
CMR.20 It is now being utilized by governments and international organizations to
further their abilities to develop effective ways of delivering security assistance.21
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Its proponents conceptualize SSR to include, on the one hand, a more comprehensive
‘security community’ in the process of democratization, civil–military relations, and
conflict prevention rather than only the traditional military and police forces On the
other hand, they also hope to inspire a more thorough understanding of today’s
security environment.22 Proponents of SSR argue that, because human security and
development matter as much as defence against external and internal threats (of
both a military and non-military nature), armed forces cannot, alone, deal with
these challenges. They further argue that ensuring security requires a collaborative
approach among a wider array of military and civilian institutions, which they
term the ‘security sector’. It should be noted that the focus in SSR is overwhelmingly
on the instruments of security themselves, and their control, and for all but a few of
the proponents, only marginally on roles and missions.
For its advocates, at a minimum the security sector encompasses ‘all those organi-
zations that have the authority to use, or order the use of force, or the threat of force,
to protect the state and its citizens, as well as those civil structures that are responsible
for their management and oversight’. These include: the military; specialized peace
support operation (PSO) forces; intelligence agencies; justice and law-enforcement
institutions; the civilian structures that manage them; and representatives of non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and the mass media.23 At the maximum, the
security sector includes all of the above, plus other militarized non-state groups
that play a role, even negative, in security issues, such as guerrillas or liberation
armies.
The Utility of SSR
SSR has made conceptual contributions as it fills in some of the gaps in the traditional
concept of CMR.
First, the SSR agenda moves away from considering the military to be the sole
security provider of a nation, and proposes a broad concept of a uniformed/
non-uniformed ‘sector’ or ‘community’ whose members must work together to
achieve security.
Second, it takes into account the contemporary interchangeable roles and missions
of the security sector components. These include, for example, armed forces perform-
ing police and diplomatic tasks, as well as social development work, while police and
other law enforcement bodies perform military tasks to safeguard society against
external threats, in particular after terrorist attacks. The concept also includes the
internationalization of the security agencies (international/multinational peace
support operations and/or police forces; international anti-terrorism cooperation
among intelligence agencies).
Third, a SSR conceptualization explicitly links security sector reform directly to
broader efforts toward democratization, human-rights promotion, conflict prevention,
and post-conflict reconstruction. It seeks to connect to wider political, economic,
social, and cultural transformations that accompany democratization, as well as
taking into account civil society which is expected to be more involved in influencing
policymaking, violence reduction and conflict prevention.
DEMOCRATIZATION AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 913
Problems with the SSR Conceptualization
Despite the claim that SSR better suits the contemporary security and political
environment, it is still analytically flawed. First, there is the lack of consensus and
understanding among SSR proponents about what the security sector encompasses.
According to Timothy Edmunds, an early and leading proponent of SSR, a security
sector that is too broadly defined jeopardizes understanding of the security sector and
hence what is needed to reform it. For example, to include non-military bodies (such
as the health care system) which, although it may undoubtedly play an important role
in the provision of a nation’s security, takes us beyond the key responsibility of the
security sector which is the legitimate use of force.24 In addition, conceptualizing the
security sector so that it includes all the organizations that use force, whether or not
they are part of the government (for instance, guerrillas or liberation armies) also
jeopardizes the utility of SSR as they have no affiliation with the state.25
Second, there is no general understanding of what SSR stands for, or what its
agenda, features, challenges, and effects are.26 In our research on SSR, we have
found a huge variety of definitions, at least 15, ranging from ‘the provision of security
within the state in an effective and efficient manner, and in the framework of demo-
cratic civilian control’ to ‘the transformation of security institutions so that they play
an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and
internal security for their citizens’, which ‘requires broad consultation and includes
goals such as strengthening civilian control and oversight of the security sector; demi-
litarization and peace-building; and strengthening the rule of law’.27 In the view of
one critical SSR proponent, Mark Sedra, the ‘variances in interpretation of the
concept have contributed to a significant disjuncture between policy and practice’.28
In this sense, while the SSR concept has been formally adopted by the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and various states in their offi-
cial foreign policy documents, the ways countries implement it differs greatly.29 In
addition, although several security programmes were implemented as part of a
SSR agenda, they dealt with only limited SSR components (e.g., police or armed
forces reform), while not embracing its claimed holistic characteristics, thus failing
to comply with a crucial element of the SSR normative model.30
Third, and most importantly for our purposes in this article, SSR lacks a consist-
ent conceptualization, which is undoubtedly due to the diverse definitions. It is
instead put forward as either a long ‘checklist’ that countries’ security agencies
need to complete for policy reasons (such as strengthening the armed forces,
police, and judicial bodies’ capabilities; improving civilian management and
democratic control of the security sector; and promoting respect for human rights
and transparency);31 as a ‘context-depending’ situation (for example, developmental,
post-authoritarian or post-conflict);32 or as different, but possibly overlapping,
‘generations’ (the first generation of reforms that focuses mainly on control, or the
second generation of reforms that includes effectiveness and efficiency).33 Of all
the many conceptualizations we reviewed, the approach Timothy Edmunds proposes,
which also analyses the interdependency of control, effectiveness, and efficiency, is
both most useful and similar to what we propose in our reformulation of CMR.34
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Civil–Military Relations in Our Revised Framework
We have found from our experience with the Center for Civil-Military Relations
(CCMR) in working with civilians and military officers in consolidating democracies,
that the analytical focus exclusively on civilian control and on armed forces in national
defence is not adequate either empirically or, for the purpose of developing compari-
sons, conceptually. Militaries have long been engaged in humanitarian assistance such
as disaster relief, or to back up the police in domestic upheavals and riots. Peacekeep-
ing became increasingly critical in the former Yugoslavia, parts of Africa, East Timor
and elsewhere; more and more countries opted to provide peacekeepers. Attacks by
international terrorists in Bali, Nairobi, New York, Washington, Madrid, London,
Amman, and elsewhere, and the launch of Washington’s ‘global war on terrorism’,
have compelled militaries everywhere to become involved in fighting terrorism to a
greater or lesser extent. Thus, leaders must pay attention to matters both of control
and outcomes, and with instruments beyond the armed forces; they must provide
for security that today is both domestic and international, with the latter including
at least PSO, as in providing troops to NATO in Afghanistan, and cooperation in intel-
ligence to counter the threat of international terrorism. In short, the challenge today is
not only to assert and maintain control, but also to develop effective militaries and
other security instruments to implement a broad variety of roles and missions. In
our conceptualization, therefore, while civilian control is considered a fundamental
aspect of democratic consolidation, and is not assumed to exist in any particular
case, it is only a part of the analysis.35 Analysis of how effective security forces are
and at what cost is also necessary to understand the contemporary importance for
democracy of the relationship between elected leaders and the security forces.
Democratic Control, Effectiveness and Efficiency
In order to capture the priorities and requirements of both democratic consolidation
and contemporary security challenges, we analyse CMR according to the three
dimensions of control, effectiveness and efficiency.
Democratic Civilian Control
At a basic level, what elected leaders are concerned about in most of the newer
democracies, and scholars in the established democracies, is how to achieve and
then to maintain the armed forces under democratic civilian control. Why are these
leaders and the literature on civil–military relations so heavily focused on control?
The answer is captured in the classic dilemma, ‘Who guards the guardians?’ Any
armed force strong enough to defend a country is also strong enough to take it
over. This is, of course, the formulation behind most analyses of civil–military
relations, not only leading into military governments but also out of them.36 The
issue is all the more important in those states where the military was the government
and still enjoys prerogatives it negotiated for itself during the transition from author-
itarian rule. Control is the fundamental concern with regard to the intelligence
apparatus, which works in secrecy, while the very foundation of democracy rests
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on accountability and transparency. This becomes clearer in the case of most
non-democratic regimes, military governments or former Soviet bloc countries,
where intelligence served state security, protecting the authoritarian regime against
its own citizens.
There are three main instruments that governments use to achieve security: the
military, police, and intelligence services. Each of these in turn can be subdivided.
Militaries are divided into services, typically army, navy, marines, and air force;
then further into communities such as infantry, artillery, aviators, surface warfare,
etc.; and into active or reserve branches. Police forces can be divided into paramilitary
units, such as carbineer or gendarmerie; national police forces, as in Colombia, El
Salvador, and Romania; by state or municipality, as in Brazil and the US. Intelligence
agencies can be divided into military, civilian national, and police intelligence, to
name just a few.
The next question is how are these three main instruments of state security con-
trolled by democratically elected leaders? There is a wide spectrum of possible
control mechanisms. Most countries, and especially newer democracies, however,
are characterized by the paucity in the number and robustness of these controls. It
is not sufficient to focus only on the mechanisms for democratic control of the
armed forces in external defence as this would encompass few of the contemporary
roles and missions in which the security forces are engaged. Rather, we should
broaden our approach to encompass both the six contemporary roles and missions
we review below and the three instruments of security. Democracies should consider
control over all instruments of security in implementing the spectrum of roles and
missions. While at the local level these may be easily conceptualized, at a more
global level things are much more complicated. Any discussion of multinational
efforts such as countering terrorism and organized crime, or supporting peace
operations, must include the umbrella organizations that are charged with carrying
out specific missions. These include, for example, NATO, the United Nations,
European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
and the African Union. While each of these organizations has its own policies and
bureaucracy, national executive branches do not cede control over their own security
forces that participate in coalition operations. States maintain control through
mandates that are further qualified by caveats.37
Our position is that democratic control depends less on the roles and missions that
are assigned, such as the armed forces doing police work, than on the mix of security
instruments and how the control mechanisms are institutionalized.38 Our main argu-
ment, building on past work, is to conceptualize control in terms of authority over the
following: institutional control mechanisms, oversight, and professional norms. The
first set of mechanisms – institutional control mechanisms – refers to the institutions
in place to control the three instruments of security. These include a wide spectrum
beginning with a clear legal basis, ministries of defence, committees in parliaments
with authority over policy and budgets, national security councils, and officer-
promotion processes.39 The next mechanism – oversight – means whether the
civilians actually keep track of what the armed forces or other security forces do;
are they in fact following the direction and guidance they receive? This mechanism,
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and the elements determining whether it works or not, includes not only the formal
oversight mechanisms, and their staffing, in the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches, but also the media, NGOs, and think tanks.40 The third mechanism – pro-
fessional norms – means whether the security institutions have been recruited,
educated, trained, promoted, and the like to have internalized the previous two
control mechanisms, and thus to indeed act in accord with the goals of the civilians.41
These three sets of mechanisms are, in the best of circumstances, utilized by demo-
cratically elected civilians to exercise control over security forces. But, there is much
more involved in security and democracy. We must also consider effectiveness and
efficiency.
Effectiveness in Fulfilling Roles and Missions
What are the current major roles and missions of security forces?42 What should the
services be effective and efficient in implementing? We have determined from a
review of the literature and conducting our CCMR programmes globally, that they
fall into six major categories: 1) fight, and be prepared to fight, external wars; 2)
fight, and be prepared to fight, internal wars or insurgencies; 3) fight global terrorism;
4) fight crime; 5) provide support for humanitarian assistance; and, 6) prepare for and
execute peace support operations.
While there are some cases in which effectiveness in implementing roles and mis-
sions can be demonstrated, we believe that generally effectiveness is best determined
by whether or not a state is prepared to fulfil any or all of the six roles.43 Success is
very difficult to measure in many, or even most, instances. When countries prepare to
fight wars against external enemies, the greatest indicator of success in most cases is
avoidance of armed combat, whether it is due to the perception of overwhelming
force on one side, success in the use of diplomatic tools, integration into NATO or
the like. The best recent example is probably the Cold War, which never did
become hot directly between the United States and the Soviet Union, arguably the
result of a credible mutual nuclear deterrence. In the case of internal wars, with
recent cases including Colombia, Nepal, and the Philippines, there are economic,
political, and social causes behind the conflicts and the security forces alone
cannot resolve them. Fighting tends to drag on, and it is all but impossible to ever
declare ‘victory’. The fight against global terrorism can be considered successful
when no attack occurs. It is impossible to know, however, if there was no attack as
a result of effective security measures, or because the terrorists simply chose not to
attack. Fighting crime is ongoing, as is the provision of humanitarian assistance.
Neither criminals nor natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, and
the like, are ever going to disappear. These are a matter of preparation and mitigation,
keeping the level of crime or loss of life and property within acceptable limits
(leaving aside the question, acceptable to whom?). With regard to peace support oper-
ations, the issue is similar. If conflicts between parties arise due to religious, ethnic, or
political differences and require intervention by foreign security forces, in some cases
without the agreement of the government in place in a capital, the troops’ presence in
itself will not resolve the fundamental causes behind the fighting. Rather, they may
provide some stability, separate the antagonists, and allow space for negotiations.
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While we may have much to say about what is required for security measures to be
effective, we must nevertheless be realistic about our ability to measure effectiveness.
Based upon our studies of what is necessary to be effective in fulfilling any of the
six roles and missions we suggest three basic requirements. First, there must be a plan
in place, which may take the form of a strategy or even a doctrine. Examples include
national security strategies, national military strategies, strategies for disaster relief,
doctrine on intelligence, counter-terrorism doctrine, and the like. We find that the
formulation by a prominent student of strategy, Hew Strachan, captures our
meaning well.
In the ideal model of civil–military relations, the democratic head of state sets
out his or her policy, and armed forces coordinate the means to enable its
achievement. The reality is that this process – a process called strategy – is
iterative, a dialogue where ends also reflect means and where the result –
also called strategy – is a compromise between the end of policy and the
military means available to implement it.44
Second, there must be structures and processes both to formulate the plans and
implement them. These include ministries of defence, national security councils or
other means of inter-agency coordination. Third, a country must commit resources,
in the form of political capital, money, and personnel, to ensure it has sufficient
equipment, trained forces and other assets needed to implement the assigned roles
and missions. Lacking any one of these three components, it is difficult to imagine
how any state would effectively implement any of these roles and missions.
Efficiency in the Use of Resources
This dimension is, of course, complicated initially by the wide variety of potential
roles and missions, and the difficulty in establishing measures of effectiveness for
any one, let alone a combination of them. We must first clarify the conceptual distinc-
tions between effectiveness and efficiency, as we often find the terms used
interchangeably, and a review of the literature on organization theory, political tran-
sitions and defence economics shows that the terms effectiveness, efficiency,
efficacy, cost-effectiveness, and the like are not used in a consistent manner. We
find most agreement on the definition of ‘effectiveness’. Chester Barnard, in his
1938 classic The Functions of the Executive, states: ‘What we mean by “effective-
ness” of cooperation is the accomplishment of the recognized objectives of coopera-
tive action.’45 The comparative politics scholar Juan Linz defines effectiveness in a
way similar to Barnard’s: ‘“Effectiveness” is the capacity actually to implement
the policies formulated, with the desired results.’46 We thus find support in the
literature for our conceptualization of effectiveness as the ability to actually
achieve stated goals.
Efficiency as a concept is strongly associated with physics, economics, and organ-
ization theory. In 1961, Herbert Simon stated: ‘The criterion of efficiency dictates
that choice of alternatives which produces the largest result for the given application
of resources.’47 Arthur M. Okun writes: ‘To the economist, as to the engineer,
efficiency means getting the most out of a given input . . . If society finds a way,
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with the same inputs, to turn out more of some products (and no less of the others), it
has scored an increase in efficiency.’48 In reviewing the literature, we have not found
a more useful definition. In the field of defence economics, the term used is ‘cost-
effectiveness’, in recognition of the absence of the market and the political monopoly
status of a government in a given territory. While there is general recognition that the
concept must be limited in the public context, governmental agencies still should
make efforts to determine the most efficient use of resources.49
As this third aspect is even more complicated to conceptualize and evaluate than
effectiveness, the discussion here is necessary not only to fill out the concepts for
analysis, but also to deconstruct the facile ‘solutions’ often used to supposedly
measure efficiency in national security and defence.50 While it may generally be
said that efficiency means getting ‘more bang for the buck’, there are serious pro-
blems with both conceptualization and measurement. First, because security is a
public activity, where the so-called bottom line does not apply, there is no market
mechanism to assign a value to whether an activity is being done efficiently – that
is, making a profit, or not. Second, competition, in the form of a peer government
within the same territorial boundaries, is not at work. There is, then, no objective
criterion for efficiency; nor, for that matter, are there incentives to achieve it. Thus
the literature on private enterprises, and their efficiency measures does not apply.
There are further considerations that must be noted. As anyone who works in
government is aware, public agencies and funds can be utilized as a ‘jobs programme’
to employ specific categories of people. This can run from keeping people off the dole
to ensuring congressional or personal prerogatives are satisfied to outright nepotism.
Along the same lines, government agencies are required to buy from certain suppli-
ers, where neither cost nor quality are the major considerations. Such acquisitions
range from purchasing furniture made by prison inmates to contracting for technical
support from organizations that provide money for election campaigns. All lucid
persons know how these externalities function, and no conceptualization of efficiency
that we have seen can adequately account for them.51
In some sectors of the public realm, education or transportation, for example,
efficiency can be measured to some degree by kilometres of roads laid, numbers of
bridges or schools built, or percentage of students who graduate, per tax dollar
spent. In security, with regard to the six roles, these rudimentary measures of
efficiency do not apply. How, for example, can we measure the deterrent value of
the armed forces, of a nuclear capability, of submarines vs. aircraft carriers vs. squa-
drons or divisions? How should we assess the value of a ‘hearts and minds campaign’
over ‘military force’ in an internal war? Or how, in fighting terrorism, should we rate
the efficiency of intelligence when success means nothing happens? What is the best
way to determine whether engaging in PSO is good for a country such as Brazil, or is
useful mainly to demonstrate to the global community that the country has assumed
its international responsibilities?
In short, the conceptualization and measurement of efficiency in the area of
security is extremely problematic. What can be measured are the so-called hard
data, such as numbers of tanks or airplanes produced, or number of troops
trained or equipped, for a given cost. What these indicators tell us generally in
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terms of security and force effectiveness, however, is at the least limited and
probably even misleading; policymakers nevertheless may rely on them to make,
or more likely rationalize, decisions, when almost any imaginable issue in national
security requires a broader, more strategic view than simple cost analysis. The field
of defence economics, in which the Hitch and McKean text noted above is still the
main reference after 30 years, makes some contributions, but only at the margins;
on issues that can be quantified, which are not normally as important as issues of
politics or strategy. The important decisions are made on the basis of political
calculations, even though policymakers might embellish them with some kind of
pseudo-scientific bow to efficiency.
Even so, the use of public funds in a democracy demands that government
agencies carry out systematic assessments of programme results and their costs.
Sharon Caudle, formerly of the Government Accountability Office (GAO), researches
and writes on homeland security, which encompasses all three of the security instru-
ments included in this article. She has identified seven different approaches to what
we call efficiency and she terms ‘Results Management’. The one Caudle most
strongly recommends is ‘capabilities-based planning and assessment’, which she
describes as ‘planning under uncertainty to develop the means – capabilities – to
perform effectively and efficiently in response to a wide range of potential challenges
and circumstances’.52 This formulation is attractive to us as she incorporates two of
our three dimensions, effectiveness and efficiency. She argues that institutions are
necessary to implement such planning or, for that matter, any of the seven approaches
she reviews. While this observation is obvious in the context of the United States, it
might not be elsewhere; therefore we find it worthwhile to highlight some of the insti-
tutions necessary even to begin to consider efficiency. Since the concept of efficiency
is mainly about the use of resources, institutions must deal with the allocation and
oversight of these resources. These can include what Feaver terms ‘police patrols’,
institutions whose purpose is to track and report on the allocation of resources in
other agencies of the government.53 In the United States, such institutions include
the Office of Management and Budget and inspectors general, and in the legislative
branch, the GAO which reports to both the legislative and executive branches, the
Congressional Budget Office and congressional oversight committees.54
This process is not unique to the US. For example, Romania’s legislature exercises
control over the budget, which is ensured in various ways: parliament approves the
budget for the security institutions; annually it revises and adopts the Law on the
State Budget, governing allocations to the security institutions; legislative committees
assess draft budgetary allocations for the intelligence agencies; parliament requires
annual reports, usually during the drafting of the following year’s allocations; and
the Court of Audits, an independent body with budgetary responsibilities, functions
in support of the parliament. Brazil has both an executive branch Secretaria de Controle
Interno da Presideˆncia da Repu´blica (Presidential Secretariat for Internal Control)
which oversees the executive’s budget in general, and the Tribunal de Contas da
Unia˜o (National Audit Board) which oversees budgets for the judicial branch.
It should be obvious that the three elements of CMR must be assessed as interde-
pendent parts of a whole in a democratic context. Each of the three is necessary, and
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individually none is sufficient. Civilian control is basic and fundamental, but is
irrelevant unless the instruments for achieving security can effectively fulfil their
roles and missions. And, both control and effectiveness must be implemented at an
affordable cost or they will vitiate other national priorities. While the focus by the
scholars working in CMR and by most proponents of SSR is exclusively on
control, the other two sides of the triangle must be included as well to assess the
wider impact of roles and missions, and the instruments of security, on democracy.
Democracy is not only about institutions; legitimacy is also necessary.
The debates in Canada and several Western European countries in 2007–2008 on
sending troops to serve with NATO’s ISAF in Afghanistan no doubt have an impact
on how citizens view the responsiveness and credibility of their governments. We
have seen that, despite initial resistance by segments of the populations, the govern-
ments of Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, in sending security forces (military, police, and
carabineer) for PSO in Haiti, have generated pride in and increased support for the
governments and security forces.55 In short, how effective and efficient the govern-
ment handles defence and security issues can influence its legitimacy. The main
intellectual and even policy challenge seems to be to recognize that of the six possible
roles and missions, external defence is the least prevalent today, yet it is the one most
militaries still prefer and the one most civilians focus on, possibly because it is so
unlikely they don’t have to provide many resources for the security forces.
Tradeoffs
Democratic Control and Effectiveness
Although it may seem counter-intuitive, increased democratic control can improve
effectiveness in military, intelligence, and police forces. Based on historical research,
Deborah Avant concludes, ‘Having more civilians control the army made it easier,
not harder, for the army to maintain its focus.’56 While too much direction and over-
sight obviously can hamper security services’ capabilities or reveal sources and
methods in intelligence, implementing ‘good’ control, i.e., instituting control and
oversight in a way that provides top-level direction and general oversight guidance,
as opposed to malfeasance or cronyism, leads to improved effectiveness. For
example, one of the few acknowledged successes in US civil military relations, the
1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, both reinforced
democratic civilian control and mandated ‘jointness’ for the military services in the
United States. Although some interoperability issues certainly remain, US forces
have been more effective at fulfilling their various roles and missions since this
level of democratic control was enacted. Operation Desert Storm, operations in the
former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, and the initial combat success in Iraq bear
witness to these improvements.
Romania provides a good example of how democratic control can improve
effectiveness in an intelligence organization, which is positive for legitimacy of
the government (and facilitated NATO membership and European Union accession).
As Romania made its transition to democracy, its intelligence structure consisted of
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as many as nine agencies with little oversight, direction or clear roles and missions.
As both the executive and legislative branches implemented control mechanisms, the
intelligence community in Romania began to improve. For example, the executive
branch created the National Supreme Defence Council (CSAT), which organizes
and coordinates all intelligence activities.57 The CSAT monitors and validates
national security and military strategies, as well as intelligence products from the
agencies. Similarly, legislative control and oversight of intelligence agencies is exer-
cised through specialized parliamentary committees. Together, the CSAT and parlia-
ment have reduced the Romanian intelligence community from nine organizations to
six; improved recruitment, training and professionalism; and clarified the mission of
each agency. As a result of these measures, the Romanian intelligence apparatus is
both more effective and more efficient.58
Colombia is also an interesting case. When the Colombian Armed Forces were
left to their own, based on an understanding during the return to democracy in
1958, with minimal civilian control, they emulated the US, with whom they served
in the Korean Conflict in the 1950s, and bought equipment and trained as though
they were the US, rather than a developing country confronting violent domestic
insurgents. Meanwhile the guerrillas, especially the Revolutionary Armed Forces
of Colombia (FARC), increasingly took control over large sections of the country,
stimulating the emergence of a competing body of paramilitary organizations, which
resulted in a spiral of violence that made Colombia all but ungovernable. With the
election of President Alvaro Uribe in 2002, and his taking strong personal control
over the armed forces, police, and intelligence organizations, they were forced to
confront the internal conflict with the result that security has greatly improved, the
legitimacy of the government increased (with President Uribe re-elected in 2006),
and development promoted.
Democratic policing involves the executive (including mayors, and governors in
the case of federal systems) and judicial branches, from within the police forces and,
in particular, from civil society, where there is naturally a greater emphasis on the
direction and oversight of police activity than on the military. Case studies in Colom-
bia, Brazil, and Chile show that the institution of democratic reforms and control
mechanisms produces more professional, trusted, and effective police, with more
public support.59
Democratic Control and Efficiency
While we believe that improved democratic control generally improves effectiveness,
efficiency is not always a by-product of increased democratic control. In most
countries, there are several different branches of the military, along with various
intelligence organizations. This diversity fosters improved democratic control in
that no single security apparatus monopolizes all government knowledge or power;
yet it often leads to duplication of effort and bureaucratic competition among
various entities vying for government resources. The reality is that direction and
oversight are costly. If security services never had to testify before legislative
committees, provide data to oversight organizations, reform their institutions when
problems are uncovered, undergo time-consuming audits, or improve professional
922 DEMOCRATIZATION
standards, then all resources might be used to obtain the best military equipment,
provide the most intelligence product or increase the number of police on the streets.
Despite this, it is not always the case that increased democratic control will reduce
efficiency. Police reform, in particular, has improved efficiencies when a comprehen-
sive approach to democratic control is adopted. In the Chilean and Brazilian cases,
community policing efforts, while initially difficult and costly, have helped create
efficient policing in the long term because citizens worked to support their own
security.
Probably most important is for democratically elected decision-makers to have a
realistic understanding of efficiency in the roles and missions of security forces.
Applying a simplified business model to this area is inappropriate and can lead to
disaster. An example of disaster was President Berger of Guatemala’s decision to
cut the military by some 50 per cent on taking office in early 2004 to 15,000 men.
The result was a wave of violence by street gangs and organized crime, resulting
in the decision by the recently elected President Alvaro Colom to double the size
of the military in early 2008 to counter the violence.
Effectiveness and Efficiency
Improvements in management and leadership that increase effectiveness may yield
positive results in efficiency, as fewer resources are consumed. But it is more often
the case that an operation may be effective while being quite inefficient. Launching
numerous expensive missiles at a single target and destroying it ‘multiple times’ is
clearly effective but not efficient. Similarly, a ‘just in time’ supply chain works
well for Costco and Target, but not for a warship at sea or a brigade in combat.
They require redundancy and self-sufficiency for effectiveness, but this is not
efficient in the normal use of the term. Further, allocating a large police force in
response to a spate of crime in a certain area may cause crime to go down, but
costs may disproportionately go up.
Conclusion
Our purpose in this article is to synthesize conceptually what we have learned in our
experience with CCMR programmes globally on the relationship of three instruments
of security employed in six different roles and missions on democracy. Through our
teaching and review of the literature we have found that the overwhelming focus in
the classical literature on civil–military relations is on civilian control over the armed
forces, and at the national level. The literature on military power and military effec-
tiveness is all about armed conflict and war, and is very historical. We have found a
need to expand analysis and programmes on at least six different roles and missions to
include three factors that we believe constitute contemporary civil–military relations:
control, effectiveness, and efficiency. We also find support in the more analytical
research on security sector reform by Timothy Edmunds and his colleagues, and a
similar concern and development of concepts based on their experience in support
of our conceptualization of a trinity. To achieve its purpose, each of the three
aspects requires particular institutions responsible for control and implementation.
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Although we consider the common applications of indicators of efficiency to be
something of a ‘red herring’ in the field of security, there is a need for a set of
institutions to allocate and oversee the application of resources as part and parcel
of democratic accountability and transparency.
While there is still concern in many of the newer democracies with achieving
democratic civilian control over the armed forces, there is generally little awareness
of the institutions necessary to achieve and exercise this control, and minimal politi-
cal will to create them once their potential importance is recognized. In addition to
institutional control mechanisms, we include oversight and the inculcation of pro-
fessional norms. There is increasing awareness today, however, that control, in and
of itself, is not much use if the instruments of security – military, police, and intelli-
gence – are not effective in achieving the roles and missions assigned them by the
civilian leadership. This is particularly important as the contemporary spectrum of
domestic roles and missions, such as fighting crime and providing humanitarian
assistance after natural disasters receives increasing scrutiny; international roles
that include fighting against terrorists or providing capable peacekeepers also raise
considerable expectations of effective security forces.
Democratic civilian control is necessary; all of the literature in CMR and demo-
cratic consolidation recognizes this fact. But we also believe that democracy, which
requires legitimacy beyond institutions, also necessitates that governments, including
the security sector, be seen as both effective and efficient. Increasingly, populations
are aware that their security forces must not only be under control, but can also
implement the assigned tasks at a reasonable cost. If the only role of the military
were to fight and win wars, this point is moot since few wars are fought and if the
country loses the government collapses in any case. But, citizens are aware if the
security forces are effective or not in fighting organized crime, participate in PSO
with other respected states, and provide humanitarian assistance when disasters
occur. From our experience we see successes at implementing the trinity in several
countries. One such example is El Salvador, with fighting against street gangs and
sending troops to Iraq resulting in huge influx of resources from the US. An
example of failure is the US over Hurricane Katrina and the seemingly unending
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Other examples can be given, on both sides, but
what is most important is that democratic decision-makers better understand what
is necessarily best to prepare their countries, and their security forces, to implement
the roles and missions they assign them. We hope this article will bring a new per-
spective on the relationship between the democracy and security arenas; moreover,
we hope that this effort at conceptualization and integration will stimulate others’
interest in the broader impact on democracy of different elements of civil–military
relations and a productive ongoing cross-fertilization with security sector reform.
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